We explore the level and determinants of compliance with Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) financial and governance standards by Islamic banks (IBs).
Introduction
We examine the determinants of compliance with Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) standards by Islamic Banks (IBs).
The literature on compliance with AAOIFI explores the compliance level (e.g., Ullah, 2013; Vinnicombe, 2010; Ahmed and Khatun, 2013) . However, the determinants of the compliance, considering both firm characteristics and board and Sharia Supervisory Board (SSB) characteristics, have not yet been empirically investigated. Our paper fills the research gap. Furthermore, majority of prior research focuses on a single country (e.g., Hafij, 2013; Ahmed and Khatun, 2013) , or is restricted to one category of AAOIFI standards such as the presentation of financial statements (Hafij, 2013) or Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) (Hassan and Harahap, 2010) .
We contribute to existing literature in a number of ways. First, we consider majority of IBs that adopt AAOIFI. Secondly we consider three AAOIFI standards related to Sharia, social and (AAOIFI, 2010) . Based on this standard, the annual report contains 7 basic statements in addition to basic information about the bank, significant accounting policies and other information.
about the IFI's compliance with Islamic Sharia; information about IFI's economic resources and related obligations; information to assist in the determination of Zakat; IFI's discharge of its fiduciary and social accountabilities"

Relevant literature and hypotheses development
We use both agency and signalling theories to identify the potential drivers of compliance with AAOIFI standards.
Firm-specific characteristics
Auditor
Auditors play an important role in the credibility of firms' financial information (Healy and Palepu, 2001 ). Chalmers and Godfrey (2004) stated that to maintain their reputation and avoid reputation costs, high-profile auditing companies are more likely to demand high levels of disclosure. The signalling theory suggests that the choice of an external auditor can serve as a signal of firm value. Generally, companies signal the quality of their financial reports by choosing large audit firms (Datar et al., 1991) . This expectation is consistent with agency theory which holds that larger audit firms have a stronger incentive to impose more extensive disclosure standards because they have more to lose from damage to their reputations. The findings of Xiao et al. (2004) supported this proposition with a positive relationship between firms employing one of the Big 4 international auditing firms and their scopes of corporate disclosure. Guerreiro et al., (2008) ; Hodgdon et al. (2009) examined corporate disclosure and found it to be positively related to auditor size. Therefore, we hypothesize that:
H1. The degree of disclosure is predicted to be higher in IBs audited by the Big 4 auditors than in IBs that are audited by non-Big 4 auditors
Age of bank
Older, well-established companies are likely to disclose much more information in their annual reports than younger companies because they are less likely to suffer any competitive disadvantage. In addition, the cost and the ease of gathering, processing, and disseminating the required information may be a contributory factor (Owusu-Ansah, 1998) . Many studies have shown that disclosure level is positively associated with company age (Cormier et al., 2005; Hossain and Hammami, 2009 ) while others (Alsaeed, 2005) conclude that the age of the corporation has insignificant association with the level of disclosure. Therefore, we hypothesize that: H2: Older IBs are expected to disclose more information than younger IBs
Firm size
According to agency theory, larger firms need to disclose more information to different user groups which leads to a decline in agency costs and reduces information asymmetries (Inchausti, 1997) . In prior disclosure studies, the association between firm size and disclosure reporting is mixed. For example, while some studies found a positive association (Hassan et al., 2006; Elshandidy et al., 2013) , others found an insignificant association (Rajab and Schachler, 2009 ). Firm size is a significant determinant of disclosure and accounting policy choice" and a "discriminator for accounting quality (Rahman et al., 2002) . Moreover, large firms face higher demand for information from customers, analysts and the general public (Cooke, 1989) . This results in increased pressure to disclose information. Therefore, we hypothesize that:
H3. Large IBs are more likely to disclose more information than small IBs 3.1.4 Profitability Inchausti (1997) suggested that profitability is capable of influencing the extent to which companies disclose information items. Consistent with the signalling theory, management when in possession of "good news" due to better performance are more likely to disclose more detailed information to the stock market than that provided by companies in possession of "bad news" to avoid undervaluation of their shares. Ahmed and Courtis (1999) showed that the results of prior studies provide mixed evidence on the association between firm's profitability and the level of corporate disclosure. Elshandidy et al. (2013) reported a positive association between both variables. Nonetheless, agency theory expects that managers of firms with high profitability would tend to provide more corporate information to justify their present performance to the shareholders.
Therefore, we hypothesize that:
H4. Disclosure are expected to be higher for highly profitable IBs than low profit 3.1.5 Internal Sharia auditing department (ISAD) Mercer (2004) argued that the Sharia auditing department "serve as the first line of defence against disclosure errors, ferreting out unintentional errors caused by weaknesses in a company's internal controls and intentional errors due to fraud". The internal audit function plays a unique and critical role in corporate governance by helping to ensure the reliability of financial reporting (Gramling et al., 2004; Carcello et al., 2005) . The literature provides evidence that internal auditing has positive impact on financial reporting oversight and level of disclosure. Schneider and Wilner (1990) found that the presence of internal auditors deters fraudulent financial reporting. Other studies establish links between internal auditing and firm performance (e.g., Gordon and Smith, 1992) . Archambeault et al. (2008) highlighted the need for an internal audit to improve governance transparency. Wilson and Walsh (1996) provided a basis for predicting that an internal auditing department will increase investors' confidence in financial reporting reliability and perceived oversight effectiveness. Therefore, we hypothesize that:
H5: The level of corporate disclosure is positively associated with ISAD inside IBs
Corporate Governance (CG) of BOD characteristics
To develop our research hypotheses, we review prior research which suggests an association between corporate disclosure and certain corporate governance mechanisms (La Porta et al., 2002; Eng and Mak, 2003) .
Number of block holders
A block holder is a shareholder with an exceptionally large amount of shares. Early research indicated a negative relation between block holder ownership and disclosure (Schadewitz and Blevins, 1998; Hossain et al., 1994) , while Haniffa and Cooke (2002) found a positive association. Marston and Polei (2004) argued that investors who own a large proportion of equity shares in a company can obtain information about the company from internal sources. Therefore, more closely held companies are more likely to disclose less information because their large investors can access internal sources of information. Therefore, we hypothesize that:
H6. IBs with high percentages of block holder ownership have low levels of disclosures
Institutional ownership
Agency theory predicts that ownership structure affects the level of corporate disclosure (Eng and Mak, 2003) . The relationship between institutional ownership and disclosure has been examined in prior studies; however, the empirical evidence is mixed. Schadewitz and Blevins (1998) found a negative association, while Mangena and Pike (2005) found a positive association between the two variables. IBs with a concentrated ownership structure do not have to disseminate more corporate information, because the main shareholders can easily obtain it, as they usually have access to that information. Therefore, we hypothesize that:
H7. There is a negative relationship between disclosure and institutional ownership
Foreign ownership
Based on agency theory, Fama and Jensen (1983) suggested that as the number of shareholders increases and ownership becomes more dispersed, the demands for additional information increase. Recent studies have found an association between disclosure and foreign ownership. For instance, according to Xiao et al. (2004) , higher foreign ownership not only encourages information disclosure, but also motivates firms to create English web pages to facilitate dissemination of financial information. The extent of foreign investor ownership is an important determinant of the demand for financial information (Soderstrom and Sun, 2007) . Therefore, we hypothesize that:
H8. There is a positive relationship between disclosure for IBs and foreign ownership.
Duality in position
Role duality in position exists when the CEO (chief executive officer) is also the chairman of the board. Agency theory predicts that role duality creates individual power for the CEO that would affect the effective control exercised by the board. Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that independent directors can play a significant role in monitoring the performance of managers. The results of prior research provide mixed evidence on the association between duality in position and corporate disclosure. Some studies find a negative association between the two variables (Laksmana, 2008; Gul and Leung, 2004) . Other studies did not find any significant association (Cheng and Courtenay, 2006) . Therefore, we hypothesize that:
H9. IBs with duality in position have a lower level of corporate disclosures. Fama (1980) argued that the board of directors, which is elected by the shareholders, is the central internal control mechanism for monitoring managers. Chau and Leung (2006) suggested that independent directors will increase the quality of monitoring over management, because "they are not affiliated with the company as officers or employees, and thus are independent representatives of the shareholders' interests" (Pincus et al., 1989, p.246) . The presence of independent directors on boards may improve the quality of financial statements (Peasnell et al., 2005) . Prior research supported the positive association between disclosure and board independence (i.e. Chen and Jaggi, 2000) . Therefore, we hypothesize that: H10. IBs with higher proportions of independent non-executive directors on the board have higher levels of corporate disclosures.
Board independence
Corporate Governance of SSB Characteristics
In the context of Islam, the model of corporate governance for business organisations is derived from the Sharia rulings. For example, they have to design the system according to Sharia principles and provide stakeholders' rights protection (Hassan, 2008) . According to Grais and Pellegrini (2006) , the unique attributes of IBs must be clarified in order to improve corporate governance mechanisms. Therefore, SSB is the most important distinction between Islamic banks and conventional banks (Farook et al., 2011; Grais and Pellegrini, 2006) . Previous studies have found that the existence of the SSB and its characteristics have increased the disclosure levels of IBs (Farook et al., 2011) .
SSB size
Empirical evidence suggested that board size can affect the level of disclosure (Akhatruddin et al., 2009) . The common number of SSB members in IBs is between three and five members based on AAOIFI Governance Standard No.7. According to Chen and Jaggi (2000) , a larger board size may decrease the possibility of information asymmetry. Agency theory predicts that larger boards incorporate a variety of expertise which results in more effectiveness in the monitoring role of the boards (Singh et al., 2004) . Moreover, a higher number of board members may also reduce the uncertainty and the lack of information (Birnbaum, 1984) . The board's size is likely to affect its ability to control and review all transactions to ensure their operations. With more members, the collective knowledge and experience of SSB will increase, and lead to greater disclosure. Therefore, we hypothesize that:
H11: There is a positive relationship between size of SSB and disclosure levels
SSB Cross-memberships
Cross-memberships of SSB members may also influence the corporate disclosure of IBs (Farook et al., 2011) . There is evidence that cross-directorships increase information transparency through comparing the knowledge that is gained from other companies (Dahya et al., 1996) ; and because decisions taken at one board may become part of the information for decisions at other boards (Haat et al., 2008; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002) . The cross-membership of SSB members is preferable because of their ensuing knowledge and credibility (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989) . Furthermore, SSB members with cross-memberships will be able to adopt their tacit and explicit knowledge into their application of Sharia rulings in Islamic banking. Therefore, we hypothesize that:
H12: There is a positive relationship between SSB cross-membership and disclosure
SSB Reputation
An SSB is composed of Sharia scholars who have wide knowledge of Islamic commercial law, but less experience of secular educational institutions. Hussain and Mallin (2003) showed that the determinants affecting the directors' appointments in Bahraini banks are pertinent skills, business practice and reputation. Sharia scholars have an excellent reputation in their community because of their universal knowledge of Islam and their credibility and significant role in that community. For this reason, reputation can be used as a measure for business knowledge, and therefore, scholars who have a good reputation will be able to comprehend better the modern applications of the banking industry pertaining to disclosure. Farook et al. (2011) indicated that reputation is instrumental in measuring the disclosure level among IBs. The reputation of an SSB is measured based on SSB membership on AAOIFI committees which is similar methodology of Farook et al. (2011) . Therefore, we hypothesize that:
H13: There is a positive relationship between SSB reputation and disclosure levels
Culture (AU)
When scholars compare the disclosure practice of firms from diverse countries, they should consider country systems. A spacious amount of literature (e.g., Hope, 2003) has been conducted on determinants that might explain differences in accounting practices. Among the many factors studied, cultural values is claimed to be most essential. The national culture is an institutional factor that influences both managers' choices and investors' preferences regarding financial reporting (Hope, 2003) . Hofstede (2001) proposed six culture dimensions which are widely used in accounting research 1 (e.g., Doupnik and Tsakumis, 2004) . Jaggi and Low (2000) argued that the cultural factors of a country have an indirect impact on financial disclosures. Wong (2012) suggested that uncertainty avoidance (UA) is the most influential cultural dimension that may affect disclosure. Therefore, in this research; we just added UA in our model to see for what extent it has impacts on the disclosure level. This consists with prior research that used only this dimension (e.g., Khlif and Hussainey, 2014) . Gray (1988) argued that: The higher a country ranks in terms of uncertainty avoidance are more likely it is to rank highly in terms of secrecy or rank lower in terms of disclosure. Therefore, we hypothesize that:
H14: There is a negative association between uncertainty avoidance and disclosure
Research methodology
Sample selection
We choose all fully flagged IBs that adopted AAOIFI. Based on AAOIFI (2015), there are 141 associated members, but not all of these banks adopt AAOIFI. We choose banks that adopted AAOIFI in MENA countries (i.e. Bahrain, Yemen, Qatar, Syria, Palestine, Sudan, Oman, and Jordan). The analysis was limited to 2013 because we did not find significant differences between last 3 years (2011-2013).
Construction of disclosure indices for assessing the validity and reliability
We construct Sharia, Social and Financial indices based on AAOIFI standards as follows. First, we adopt the disclosure requirements of AAOIFI Governance Standard No.1, Accounting Standard No.1, and Governance Standard No.7. We review the last available editions for AAOIFI (2010 and 2014) . Second, we reviewed the literature that explores CSR, SSB and FS (e.g., Aribi and Gao, 2012; Maali et al., 2006; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Hassan and Harahap, 2010; Belal et al., 2014; Ahmed and Khatun, 2013) . This enables us to construct an initial index which includes 218 items required by AAOIFI standards. Then, to ensure the content validity of the index, it is reviewed independently by three other researchers. After receiving their comments and suggestions, any remaining ambiguities were discussed with a fourth experienced academic. The final index included 214 items as shown in Table 1 . To ensure the reliability of the research instrument, the principal author and two independent researchers scored five randomly selected banks. Then, the findings of the three researchers were compared. Given that the final research instrument had been agreed by all investigators, differences in the compliance scores across the investigators were not significant. Based on this, one overall index and three sub-indices (Sharia, social and financial) were constructed. The scores for the overall index and sub-indices were calculated by assigning equal weightings to each item of disclosure, and the indices were derived by computing the ratio of actual scores awarded to the maximum possible score attainable for items that were applicable to each Islamic bank.
[Insert Table 1 here]
Model specification and variable measurement
We use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) where the dependent variable is compliance/disclosure score and the independent variables include the factors discussed above. Therefore, we use the following OLS transformed multiple regression model:
Disc i= β0+ β1 AUD+ β2 AGE+ β3 SIZE+ β4 PROF+ β5 SAD+ β6 BLOCK + β7 INST + β8 FORGN + β9 DUAL+ β10 B.INDEP+ β11 SSBSIZ+ β12 SSBREPU+ β13 SSBCROSS+ β14 UNCER+ ɛ Where Disc is the compliance indices, which measures the level of compliance of SSBR, CSRR, SF and aggregate disclosure for Islamic bank i; β0 is the intercept; β1…..β14 are regression coefficients; ɛ is error term. Variables definitions are shown in Table 2 . The disclosure score for each index is calculated as a ratio of the total items disclosed to 15 (maximum score for Sharia) for model 1; 104 (maximum score for financial) for model 2; 95 (maximum score for social) for model 3 and 214 (maximum score for aggregate disclosure) for model 4.
[Insert Table 2 here] Table 3 shows the compliance levels for each bank over 2013. It shows that Bahrain Islamic bank; Qatar first investment bank and Cham bank are the highest bank that complies with sharia disclosure. Jordan Islamic bank is the highest one that discloses information about CSR whereas a Qatar Islamic bank is highest bank related to financial disclosure.
Results of Disclosure and Compliance Levels
Level of compliance by banks and countries
In terms of the comparison between disclosures types in each country, table 4 shows the disclosure levels for each country by number of banks and percentage based on average disclosure. The table indicates that Jordan disclosed 65%, which is more than Bahrain (56%). This is perhaps surprising, since compliance with AAOIFI is mandatory for IBs in Bahrain. Sudan is the lowest country for compliance with AAOIFI (46%). Bahrain has the highest number of banks that have adopted AAOIFI (15 IBs) not only because Bahrain is the host nation for the AAOIFI, but, it is a requirement of the Central Bank of Bahrain that all IFIs licensed must comply with AAOIFI (Vinnicombe, 2010) . Table 3 here] [Insert Table 4 here] Table 5 shows the compliance levels with AAOIFI Governance Standards No.1 5. It shows that the average compliance level for our selected banks is 68%. The disclosure level concerning with SSB members is 70% whereas the disclosure level concerned with SSB reports is 66%. Information about names of SSB has got the highest items (95%) whereas 22% only from our sample report that they are comply with AAOIFI.
[Insert
Compliance levels with AAOIFI standards
[Insert Table 5 here] Table 6 shows the compliance level with AAOIFI Governance Standard No.7. It shows that the average compliance level for our selected banks is 27% which is beyond our expectations. The disclosure level related to universal-oriented CSR items is 30% while the disclosure level related to Islamic-oriented CSR items is 23%. It also shows that screening and informing clients for compliance with Islamic principles has the highest score (42%) and disclosure about Waqf management has the lowest score (2%).
[Insert Table 6 here] [Insert Table 8 here] Table 9 shows the overall compliance levels for the 4 models based on disclosure related to universal and Sharia orientation. It shows that the levels of compliance related to Sharia accountability for SSBM and SSBR are mainly similar (70% and 66%). The compliance for universal CSR is 30% and for Sharia CSR items is 23%. Also, the compliance related to financial information common to international standards like IFRS is 86% whereas financial disclosure related to Sharia items is 36%. Finally, compliance levels for items related to universal orientation are higher than information related to Sharia requirements. This result shows low compliance and disclosure level for social reporting of IBs. This result is matching with Maali et al. (2006) ; Hassan and Harahap (2010) and Farook et al. (2011) that recommend the extent of CSRD by IBs falls far short of their expectation (13.3%; 38% and 16.8% respectively). Maali et al (2006) indicate that IBs are not completely fulfilling their social role in accordance with the prescriptions of Islam. Based on our result; we conclude that IBs are mainly shaped and focused on economic incentives more than social norms which consistent with Aggarwal and Yousef, (2000) . Kuran (2006) maintains that IBs appear to seek profit as aggressively as conventional banks. He argues that it is even unrealistic to suppose IBs' activities as well CSRD to differ or be more socially accountable than conventional as they run in the equal global capitalistic situations.
[Insert Table 9 here] 6. Empirical results Table 10 reports the descriptive statistics. It shows that the average compliance level based on the AAOIFI standard for SSBR requirements is 68%, the compliance level for CSR is 27%, and the compliance level for financial accountability is 73%. Finally, the overall compliance for our selected banks is 56%. 65% of the selected banks are audited by the Big 4 firms namely: Ernst and Young, KPMG, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, and 67% of the banks have a Sharia Auditing Department (SAD). The average overall age of IBs is 19 years. The average board size is 4 members. 71% of SSB members have cross-membership with SSBs in other Islamic Banks (for example, Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Ghuddah is a member of the Sharia Supervisory Boards of more than 10 Islamic Banks). 50% of our SSB members are also members of AAOIFI committees and 57% of our SSB are members in more than one Islamic bank (Cross membership). The average number of blockholders is 3, mean institutional ownership is 58% and the average foreign ownership is 63%. The mean percentage of independent directors on the board is 49%.
Descriptive analysis
[Insert Table 10 here]
Regression results
Regression results are shown in Table 11 . It shows the cross-sectional OLS regressions for the aggregated score of disclosures and three subcategories (SSB, CSR and FS). For the SSB score (model 1), we find that the coefficient estimates variables related to corporate governance of SSB are positive and significant at the 5% level. This result supports hypotheses H11, H12 and H13 that IBs which have SSBs with more than 4 members, as well as SSB members who have crossmembership with SSBs in other Islamic Banks and IBs with SSB members who are also members of AAOIFI committees disclose more Sharia information in their annual reports and websites. Furthermore, the coefficient estimates on Sharia auditing departments (SADs) is positive and significant. This supports hypothesis H5. Concerning model 2, the table shows that CSR is positive and significant with SIZE of bank at the 5% level. This result supports hypothesis H3. Furthermore, the coefficient estimate on AGE is positive and significant indicating that older IBs disclose more information about social activities, which supports hypothesis H2. For model 3, we find that the coefficient estimates on SIZE and SAD are positive and significant. Therefore, we partially accept hypotheses H3 and H5. Regarding aggregate compliance (model 4), we find significant positive association between overall compliance and SIZE, AGE and SSB SIZE at the 10% level. Therefore, hypotheses H2, H3 and H11 are partially accepted. For culture, we find that UA has a negative association with Sharia as well as aggregate disclosure level at the 10% level (models 1 and 4). This result is consistent with Elshandidy et al., (2013) who found a negative association between UA and disclosure. These results therefore support the acceptance of H14.
[Insert Table 11 here]
Discussion
The insignificant associations between corporate disclosure and auditors are consistent with prior research (Barako et al., 2006; Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Hossain et al., 1995) . Our analysis identifies a significant association between disclosure level and existing SAD. This finding is consistent with previous literature which presents SAD as one of the main determinants of compliance with AAOIFI and shows that the internal audit function can enhance the disclosure quality (Bailey et al., 2003; Gramling et al., 2004; Carcello et al., 2005) . Bank age is positively correlated with compliance. Empirically, we confirm the findings of Cormier et al. (2005) and Hossain and Hammami (2009) who reported a positive relationship between company age and corporate disclosure. The significant associations between corporate disclosure and bank size are consistent with prior empirical studies which identified company size as a determinant of disclosure level (Ahmed and Courtis, 1999; Street and Gray, 2001) . We found that profitability is not associated with disclosure level. This result supports the argument that providing full disclosure in any situation is important whether it is achieving a profit or not (Haniffa, 2002) . Also, this result is consistent with the findings of other researchers who did not find association between profitability and disclosure (Aras et al., 2010) .
The results do not support that CG attributes concerned with BOD have a significant effect on corporate disclosure. Based on our analysis, we found an insignificant link between duality in position and corporate disclosure. This result is supported by Ho and Wong (2001) , Arcay and Vazquez (2005) and Cheng and Courtenay (2006) . Related to institutional ownership, our outcome is consistent with Eng and Mak (2003) who found an insignificant relationship between the two variables. Our paper concludes an insignificant association between compliance levels and board independence which is consistent with Haniffa and Cooke (2002) and Ho and Wong (2001) who did not find a relationship between the two variables. We find that the coefficient estimates on block holders and foreign ownership have an insignificant association with corporate disclosure. The insignificant sign on the number of block holders is consistent with the research of Samaha and Dahawy (2011) who did not find association between the variables. The insignificant link between foreign ownership and disclosure is consistent with Mangena and Tauringana (2007) .
The significant associations between disclosure and CG variables concerned with SSB are consistent with prior empirical disclosure reporting research (e.g., Singh et al., 2004; Abdul Rahman and Bukair, 2013; Hussain and Mallin, 2003, Farook et al., 2011; Haat et al., 2008; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Abdul Rahman and Bukair, 2013) . Gray (1988) and Salter and Niswander (1995) showed that measures of national culture can help explain cross-country differences in accounting practices particularly with regard to disclosure level. The analysis shows that culture based on UA has a negative association with disclosure level (Sharia and aggregate). This result is supported by Hope (2003) who showed that cultural values are a determinant of differences between disclosure levels. Consequently, the purpose to achieve international convergence for IFIs, a main goal of AAOIFI, should be expanded from merely adopting a single set of high-quality accounting standards to considering the cultural values of Islamic countries as well other countries that have Islamic banks or even Islamic windows around the world.
Conclusion
We measured to what extent IBs that adopt AAOIFI standards are consistent with AAOIFI requirements. We also associated variations in SSBR, CSRR and financial statements disclosure levels with variations in both firm characteristics and corporate governance mechanisms related to BOD and SSB. The findings of this study illustrate a relatively low average level of compliance with AAOIFI disclosures related to social requirements (27%). It also indicates a relatively high average level of compliance with AAOIFI disclosures related to Sharia and financial requirements. This approximates to 68% for SSBR and 73% for financial disclosure level. We find that the corporate governance mechanisms related to SSB have significantly high explanatory power over Sharia disclosure variations compared with corporate governance mechanisms related to BOD. This can be explained based on the fact that AAOIFI standards for our selected banks are mandatory, and BOD does not have a direct role in ensuring compliance with standards, whereas SSB has a significant role in preparing reports about the compliance level with Sharia. We find also that firm characteristics (age, size and SAD) have a significant impact on disclosure variations.
These results have theoretical and practical implications. They suggest that more attention should be paid to variables that may explain the variations in Sharia, social and financial disclosure particularly those concerned with SSB. Our suggestion is consistent with a recent trend in the accounting literature (e.g., Farook et al., 2011; Abdul Rahman and Bukair, 2013) for research to look more deeply at the SSB characteristics of corporate governance. The practical implication of our results lies in our empirical evidence relevant to the importance and benefits of compliance with AAOIFI standards which has a significant impact on the image of IBs as well as approving Sharia compliance and serving society, which represent the main competitive advantages for these banks. Our results suggest that more attention should be paid to adoption of AAOIFI particularly for IBs who are members without adopting. Looking more closely at the variations in compliance with AAOIFI and the disclosure levels between the IBs in each country is useful for clearly identifying the extent to which the regulatory approach relies on either regulations or mandatory and voluntary disclosure. Furthermore, AAOIFI should take measures to make their standards mandatory for all their members as a first step to making it compulsory for all IFIs. When we measured the disclosure levels for each country, we found that Bahrain is located in the fourth place after Jordan, Syria and Palestine. Consequently, we recommend that the Central Bank of Bahrain further investigate this issue and explore the reasons and the scope for enhancing compliance with AAOIFI.
Our results related to compliance levels of banks with AAOIFI adds significantly to Islamic accounting literature by emphasising the importance of widening this research scope to pay more attention to variations above the mandated requirements (AAOIFI adoption), which provide a minimum amount of information to all stakeholders. The results indicate that organising reporting by IBs that formally implement an accounting standard (AAOIFI) significantly improves the disclosure level for Sharia compliance by encouraging them to care about their SSB report. The results support the current trend in the regulations in Bahrain, Sudan and Jordan, which encourage the mandatory adoption of AAOIFI by IBs. The un-weighted disclosure index is adapted to measure the compliance level with AAOIFI. However, this kind of disclosure index has an important limitation as the number of disclosure items required by different standards varies considerably. As in our research, some standards require a large number of items (104 items) to be disclosed (Accounting Standard No.1) whereas others require only a few items (15 items) to be disclosed (Governance Standard No.1). This may become a significant problem when studies examine compliance with AAOIFI disclosures. An alternative method recommended for future research to avoid this problem is the "partial compliance un-weighted approach" which was employed by Street and Gray (2001) ). Furthermore, our paper only focused on 3 AAOIFI standards and further research may examine other standards.
Table (1): Ensuring validity of research instrument
The weight is calculated based on final items for each standard dividend into total items (214). For example: weight of FSIFI.1 = 104/214*100= 49% 
